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This paper analyses a case study, the merger of two multinational companies, in the 
light of collective decision making. The particular organisation on which our analysis 
focuses is a traditional UK based British engineering company that in 1999 bought a 
collective of family-run businesses, scattered across Scandinavia.  This paper draws 
on the findings from a research project carried out with the newly created company 
during the post-merger period. The paper explores how the two collectives brought 
together via a merger are trying to work, make and implement decisions and move 
forward. The analysis shows how the tension generated by the different narratives 
brought to place in the merger and the initial resistance to engage in collective action 
was finally overcome by the co-authoring of a new narrative, a new ‘proceduralised 
context’. This collective co-construction is seen in the paper not as a final output but 
rather as part of a constant becoming, a ‘liquid decision making’ process (after 
Bauman, 2000). A finding of this study is that enabling symbolic spaces (contexts) for 
new narratives to emerge and develop can support the improvement of collective 
actions. 
 
Keywords: Mergers and Acquisitions, collective decision making, co-authored 
narratives, qualitative methodology, stories. 
 
1. Mergers and acquisitions, collective action and the narrative context 
 
 After a merger or acquisition process most organisations focus on the integration 
of the different ways of working that the now joined organisations have. In addressing 
this concern, research has traditionally focused on ‘post-merger integration’; 
suggesting that efforts need to be concentrated in achieving the successful post-
merger ‘acculturation’ of both companies. This usually implies achieving a ‘symbolic 
closure’. The emphasis is therefore on the ‘outcome’; rarely does research focus on 
the process of becoming a new –different- organisation and how that collective action 
is decided, implemented and accomplished. It is this area in the study of M&A, and its 
implication for collective decision making that this case study seeks to illuminate. 
When it comes to M&A , there is a general agreement about the overwhelming 
percentage of failure in the process (Allen, 2002; Deloitte and Touche, 2000; Larsson 
and Finkelstein, 1999; Hunt, 1998); as well as consensus over the fact that we do not 
know enough about these ‘complex events in organizational life’ (Larsson and 
Finkelstein, 1999:1) in order to say why they fail.  Undeniably, organizations do not 
undertake M&As for the sake of learning or experimentation, the ride is too costly 
and often painful.  M&As are usually strategic moves to expand and create new 
opportunities for commercial organisations. Organisations attempt M&As when 
trying to realise synergies (Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999), create value (Haspeslagh 
and Jemison, 1991, in Vaara, 2002) or to transfer capabilities from one organization to 
 2 
another (Laamanen, 1997). However, it would appear that despite the growing 
literature dedicated to the area, there is a ‘black box’ when it comes to understand the 
success or failure of these organisational processes (Allen et al, 2002). It is to the 
opening of this ‘black box’ that this paper aims to contribute.  
Allen et al (2002) contrasts organic growth with mergers and suggest that 
“mergers […] challenge organisations…in a very fundamental way.  It is this 
transformation of structures that presents serious management problems.” The 
authors’ highlight the time-dependency involved in developing the synergetic and 
increased performance levels of a merger. They conclude that "success is not easily 
achieved as it involves combining firms that previously operated competing business 
models, that were organized, structured, and operated in their own idiosyncratic 
fashion and which contain different people that 'know' and share different things.” 
(Allen et al, 2002:326).  
The outcome of an M&A entails a combination of human, material and 
financial assets of at least two organizations in a new legal and accounting entity 
(Hunt, 1998:324).  In most contexts, to combine two things supposes certain 
characteristics. The action necessarily brings change.  Furthermore, combining also 
requires some sort of union, link or relationship and the ‘outcome’ – or ‘whole’ – will 
not be the same as the parts which were brought together – sameness is the domain of 
cloning, not combining. In the context of M&As the entailed relationship is implicit 
in the behavioural metaphors which have been used to talk about these events (Hunt, 
1998; Schneider and Dunbar, 1992).  Looking at media narratives Schneider and 
Dunbar (1992) argue that hostile takeovers can be seen as inter-organisational events 
that threaten organizational identity and integrity.  A hostile takeover creates what 
they call a “narrative thirst”, a need for explanations that reduce uncertainty and in 
doing so provide the illusion of control. 
The dominant view is that the entities involved in an M&A need to ‘integrate’ 
or more accurately to ‘assimilate’ after the merger is ‘completed’. Existing research in 
the area tends to represent mainly the economic, financial and management 
approaches to integration, ignoring the more social, cultural and psychological aspects 
of the process.  Cultural research, however, has focused on achieving ‘acculturation’ 
through ‘social controls’ (for example: Larsson and Lubatkin, 2001:1573) as opposed 
to allowing for a more organic approach.  However, if a M&A, as suggest above, is a 
case of ‘relationships’ and ‘wholes’, then a different approach may be required.  The 
point about relationships is that they develop organically over time.  The point about 
wholes, which are different to their combined parts, is that they will contain 
‘emergent’ properties.  The question then becomes how are these relationships played 
out and what happens when two organizations are combined?  It is suggested in the 
paper that the success of an M&A lies in the organization’s ability to identify the 
emergent properties of ‘combining’ and to enable those properties, thus encouraging 
‘organic-ness’, in an otherwise mechanistic process (Garcia-Lorenzo and Nolas, 
2005). This, it is argued, may be achieved by looking at the collective process of co-
authoring narratives and listening to the tensions which, naturally abound.   
The analysis of the empirical material explores this hypothesis from a 
collective decision making point of view. It looks at how two organisational 
collectives under the stress and pressure for change, really react to problems of 
working together, of making and implementing decisions. Understanding how those 
groups go about decision making should in principle, tell us more about those 
characteristics which “we should endeavour to build into our decision tools” 
(Humphreys, 1997:3). Collective decision making is difficult to achieve when even 
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‘the organisation’ itself is difficult to define –i.e. in the mist of a merger or a post-
merger process-. It becomes then imperative to develop a new language, to create a 
narrative space, which can help to understand the new organisational boundaries and 
support the improvement of collective actions. 
Brezilion (this volume) in describing how a ‘proceduralised context’ comes 
about in organisational collectives, considers that ‘group norms’ are one of the most 
important dimensions that affects the kinds of decisions made in organisations (pg 
126). Thus, that a key point of the decision-making group is its collective knowledge 
and the context in which this knowledge is expressed. The model presented helps us 
to understand what kind of knowledge is already shared by a group, but we have little 
information of the process by which that knowledge became to be shared when for 
instance, collectives do not share the same history. Indeed, most of the models 
presented for collective decision making assume some level of shared knowledge 
and/or working habits among the members of the collective. A M&A process 
however presents us with another challenge: among two organisations brought 
together by a M&A, there might not be previously agreed or shared knowledge. And 
yet if they are to move forward, the decision making process still has to be collective. 
Thus, we might need to explore further how a ‘proceduralised context’ is 
actually produced and how what might become part of that contextual knowledge gets 
accepted by the collective and eventually becomes taken-for-granted and shared. The 
case presented in this paper aims to explore in detail one such process through which 
members of two organisations co-construct a narrative, a framework, in which 
potentially contextual knowledge is shared, contested and co-constructed before a co-
authored image of a potential future after the take-over emerges. This emerging 
narrative however is not taken here as the ‘final’ collective decision to be 
implemented but rather as what Humphreys and Jones (2006) would call a ‘rhyzome 
in the decision-hedgehog’.  
The analysis shows how the collective co-authored a new potential 
‘organisation’. The process of collaboration or co-construction was however not 
linear or conflict free. Due to the lack of ‘stable structures’ and constant becoming, 
that a M&A process implies; the collective decision making process becomes 
‘constantly drifting’, a bricolage, open, associative and decision maker driven 
(Humphreys and Jones, 2006:15). Through the co-construction of a narrative, 
knowledge, people and environment are created. Thus, the narrative in being co-
authored becomes a ‘proceduralised context’. 
 




The empirical part of the paper is informed by data collected during a research 
project with a UK based international engineering company – henceforth Acquirer 
Business (AB)
1.  One of the project’s aims was to understand some of the 
organisational challenges being faced by the company after the M&A process. The 
paper is based on the research collaboration with the marine business of the 
organisation – henceforth the acquirer marine business (AMB)– following an 
international acquisition of a collective of Scandinavian companies – henceforth the 
Collective - in 1999.  The resulting research aimed to reflect both the business needs 
                                                          
1
 For an extended description of the organisations and the research project on which this paper is based 
see Garcia-Lorenzo and Nolas, 2004. 
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and the research aims. Our analysis of the data draws from a set of 15 semi-structured 
interviews and is further supported, by the discussion groups and workshops that were 
part of the project’s qualitative methodology.  The research described in this paper has 
followed a qualitative approach to data gathering and analysis. This approach implies 
essentially an emphasis on processes and meanings rather than on an examination or 
measurement in terms of quantity, amount, intensity or frequency (Van Maanen, 
1982). 
For a period of six months, the LSE research team worked in collaboration 
with the 14 volunteers from the AB’s fast track career programme.  Together with 
these ‘internal researchers’ we were divided into four teams.  Over a three month 
period we conducted 44 interviews with senior management in the UK, Scandinavia 
and the US.   The interviewees accounted for 60% of AMB’s senior management at 
the three senior management levels – i.e. president and the executive committee, to 
their direct reports and their immediate next reports.  The interviewees also represent 
the two industries making up the ABM – Commercial and Naval -, the different 
nationalities (UK, Swedish, Norwegian, Finish and American) and the different 
organisational units (production/operations, customer interface and functions).  The 
semi-structured interviews ran for an hour and a half, they were tape recorded with 
the interviewees’ consent and then transcribed verbatim.   
In the following section, we present the analysis of the data from which the 
employees’ stories have been extracted. Stories are one of the main forms of discourse 
through which organisational members share and transmit their experiences and 
therefore co-author their organisational reality. The analysis of those stories followed 
a combination of a top-down (theory informed) and bottom-up (emergent meanings 
and categories from the data) approach.  The first analysis coded the interviews by 
general categories.  Following this initial analysis, codes were then ordered in terms 
of their frequency revealing the themes that interviewees were more concerned about. 
A second analysis focused specifically on the ‘post-merger integration’ and followed 
a combination of thematic networks analysis (Atrride-Stirling, 2002) and narrative 
analysis (Jovchelovitch, 2000; Vaara, 2002; Garcia, 2003).  
The main unit of analysis was the AMB, however we aim to express the 
different voices of acquirer and acquired pre-merger organisations. The use of 
different methods of data gathering – interviews and discussion groups - corresponds 
with the attempt to use different viewpoints to gain a greater understanding of the 
phenomena being studied adding rigor, breadth and depth to our investigation (Flick, 
1992). The different methods can also facilitate and legitimate the diverse chorus of 
voices, interests and perspectives that exist within an organisation. Thus, using an 
interpretative approach and different methods of data gathering implies also looking 
into the multiple narratives that give voice to, and allow the construction of multiple 
organisational worlds (Alvesson, 1995). 
 
 
The context  
 
The AB started off as a partnership in 1884 and has since built up a world 
renowned reputation associated with engineering excellence.  The company’s 
established engineering success, especially on developing the gas turbine which has 
become its stamp of identity,  plays a fundamental role in shaping the company’s 
reality and its ways of working.  The ‘aerospace’ nature of the business brings with it 
a high risk and dire consequences in case of engineering failure.  As such, working 
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procedures, processes and standards are rigorous and closely controlled. The structure 
of company however, is described as a ‘matrix’.  The company’s functions –i.e. HR, 
finance department etc- are separated from the business, the production/operation and 
customer interface units. This is a relatively new change since historically both 
functions and units used to work as one.  In 2003, the AB catered for four different 
markets: civil aerospace, defence aerospace, marine and energy.   
This paper concentrates on the Marine business which prior to the 1999 
acquisition catered solely for the defence marine market in the UK. The 
organization’s launch into the, until then, unfamiliar territory of the commercial 
market, doubled its capabilities and remit almost over night (the business is now 
approximately a 7,500 people operation; the majority of which are non-UK 
employees).  For a company used to long time horizons and a slow pace of change the 
acquisition thrust them into uncharted territory.  
The Collective on the other hand, could be described as historically family-run 
businesses, scattered across Norway, Sweden and Finland.  Prior to the current 
research, the Collective had undergone a series of previous acquisitions – from within 
Scandinavia followed by an acquisition from a British defence company.  As such the 
acquisition described in this paper was the second in a previous line of acquisitions.  
The product and brands acquired by the British defence company were not only very 
strong in the commercial marine market, they were also very closely linked to the 
sites and communities in which they were produced.  Furthermore, it is important to 
note that because of the short time-lapse between the two acquisitions (the British 
defence company’s acquisition and then AB acquisition of the Collective) there had 
been no ‘integration’, as such, between the British defence company and the 
Collective by the time of the second take-over took place.   
The Scandinavian company which bought part of the Collective in the first 
acquisition dates back to the 1970s.  This Norwegian company however, was more 
entrepreneurial and robust in their way of working than AB. Their flexibility is 
derived from the commercial market in which they work: time horizons are much 
shorter than in the military defence market and change is an expected part of everyday 
life.  Conversely, having only been a listed company for a short time, existing outside 
the more public sphere of business may also account for their more flexibility. The 
Scandinavian company, which brought the collective of small businesses, developed 
from a ship yard into a ‘whole value chain’, that is a complete provider of not only of 
vessels but also equipment, design and aftermarket support.  The company grew 
rapidly, and in a very short period of time, with the offshore boom in Norway in the 
late seventies.  Capitalising on the boom, and the knowledge developed during this 
period, the company transferred it to work stations around the world and is considered 
an international company.   
 In September 1999 AB acquired the Collective. The acquisition of the new 
business is described by both acquirer and acquired as more of a hostile take-over 
rather than an M&A.  Attempts were made to foster a more amicable climate, 
including a consultancy-facilitated conference in May 2000, however these were 
unsuccessful in achieving their goals.  The following year saw a change of HR 
management, a new president for the AB and the relocation to Scandinavia of key 
senior figure.  These events helped to create a more positive atmosphere.  Finally, in 
May 2001 an Annual General Meeting was held for all AB senior management from 
the UK, Scandinavia and USA.  During this meeting, delegates discussed what the 
key post-merger concerns were and suggested ways for dealing with them.  The 
meeting brought up key organisational concerns which were explored in this 
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collaborative research – ‘cultural awareness’ and ‘roles and responsibilities’ for 
‘working together’.  What follows is the story that developed after this event.  
 
After the merger 
One of the key tenants of the narrative approach is the ability to describe 
organizational change in different ways, revealing multiple interpretations of the post-
merger situation and ensuing change (Vaara, 2002:217).  The analysis of the data 
revealed that employees in both organisations positioned themselves differently with 
regard to four different but interrelated areas of concern: the effects of the merger on 
each company’s reputation and brand name; the autonomy that the acquired firm 
would have in light of tendencies towards centralisation of the acquirer company; the 
type of organisational form that the new join organisation will have and how to make 
use of the human richness and variety that the merger had brought about. These 
themes, and the stories they inform, underline key concerns and unresolved anxieties 
that employees of both companies had and that potentially have made any common 
action difficult. And yet, surprisingly, those tensions were expressed in a similar way 
regardless of company or country of origin. These themes constitute a ‘narrative of 
progress’ that shaped the employees understanding of the change process and that 
allowed for a potential ‘coming together after the merger’ through a newly 
constructed narrative between the employees of the two organisations.  
This ‘narrative of progress’ helps employees of both organisations to make 
sense of their experiences as well as serving as a guideline for future actions. Prior to 
the merger AMB had been clear about what they did, how to do it and why they did it. 
They were also clear about their future direction: expansion and growth.  AMB 
specifically brought the Collective because they were leaders in their field.  However, 
having accomplished that expansion, the planned future seemed to present problems 
when the company’s identity and ways of working were challenged by their 
association with the Collective.  
Indeed, when people get involved with other stories and cultural beings they 
tend to reach what Hill calls a level of ‘historical consciousness’ (Hill, 1988:7) that 
presupposes the notion of ‘the other’. That is, any definition of a cultural self always 
involves a distinction of the values, characteristics and ways of life of others. This 
definition does not usually arise in situations of relative isolation, prosperity and 
stability. A period of instability and crisis, a threat to the old established ways, seems 
to be required, especially if this happens in the presence of, or in relation to, other 
cultural formations. It is when something assumed to be fixed, coherent and stable is 
displaced by the experience of doubt and uncertainty that challenges to the established 
cultural order occur (Garcia-Lorenzo, 2001). Table 1 summaries the coordinates of 
the narratives brought about by the merger situation for the employees of both 
organisations (see also Garcia-Lorenzo and Nolas, 2005). Reading the table from left 
to right, we go from the common and explicitly discussed themes among the 
employees to look at the underlying tensions the present different possibilities of what 
the organisation could become in the future to end with the narrative coordinate the 
frames that discussion. The challenge would then be how to move from the present 
coordinates towards a co-created narrative space that would support collective action 






Common discussed themes Underlying Dialogical Tensions Narrative co-ordinates 
Working together, 
standing apart. 
To support homogeneity or 






Matrix organisation vs. 




making process and 
ownership 
Centralised vs. federal 
organising . 
Who: power relations 
The brand  Focusing on the product or 
on the customer. 
Why: strategy focus. 
 
The challenge of coordinated collective action 
 
The main concerns employees from both companies had in relation to the new 
situation was how to work together. The idea of two separate organizations based on 
different national cultures needing to be merged together, is pervasive. 
Indeed, one of AMB’s self-imposed tasks after the merger was to deal with the 
‘cultural difference’ by raising awareness among all employees through seminars and 
workshops. However, they explained business cultural differences through national 
cultural difference. Whereas this had been a good first step in dealing with the post-
merger situation, two years post-merger, there was a strong feeling that national 
cultural idiosyncrasies could not longer be held responsible for the continued 
challenge of working together: 
“The national cultural variances is one thing, you can’t do much about that except for, 
of course, be aware of it.  But there is I think there is more company cultural variations 
from one place to another…” (VP Business Division; Collective –Norway; 
Commercial; Customer Unit; 6:30 ) 
Attributing difficulties of integration to difference in national culture, resulted 
in obscuring the tension regarding the different ways of working at market/industry 
level.  Whereas AMB is designed to cater for both the naval and commercial markets 
the two markets are however driven by different requirements and values.  For 
example, the commercial market is driven by short lead times and large customer 
basis, whereas the naval industry works with much longer lead times and fewer 
customers. Extensive reporting procedures, both financial and technical, overshadow 
the purpose of the commercial organization, in particular their relationships with the 
customer.  For AMB however,  the bureaucratic processes and procedures are 
necessary since constant checks make the products safe and secure and therefore 
safeguard the organizations reputation in the market.  
The failure (slowness) to find an ‘integrative’ definition of what the new 
company’s focus is going to be on, is attributed by both organisations to not having 
the ‘right people’. AMB wants to find the right people to rectify this situation.  The 
Collective considers that they are the right people:  they have been successful in the 
commercial market for years and were brought for this reason. They are therefore the 
most appropriate people for the job: 
“Having the right people on board.  Because there is so many things come with people, 
their ability to communicate their willingness to change, their ambitions, willingness to 
be successful and so a lot of things come with people.  People is really the key to 
success. Competent people.” (VP Business Division; Collective -Sweden; Commercial; 
Operation Unit; 4:61) 
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In terms of future directions both organisations assume that ‘assimilation’ was 
the way to deal with the challenge of the merger.  AMB was in fact aggressively 
promoting it whereas the Collective assumed it would happen and was defensive 
about it.  
In attempts to move away from the ‘sole-product’ (gas turbine) way of  
working, AMB adopted a matrix structure separating its functions from the rest of the 
IEC businesses and reorganising itself internally into two main segments: the 
operational/production business units and the customer interface business units. The 
segments were intended to focus on different markets and customers needs.  However, 
the tradition of one-product (gas turbine) one-market (defence) business restricted this 
move.   
 
Different organisational structures  
 
As such, one of the main challenges that both organisations faced after the 
merger was to asses their different ways of organising. Whereas AMB was described 
as a ‘hybrid matrix’, inward-facing and shaped by their technology; the Collective 
described themselves more as a network, outward-facing and working in partnerships 
with customers to respond swiftly to customer demands. AMB was used to ‘internal’ 
customer relationships and defence industry contracts which run on a long-term basis 
and provide on-going security. This tension was specially felt by the Collective:  
“our global network is tailor made for supporting the marine business and [the 
company] is again looking for synergies that doesn’t exist and I’m afraid they could 
end up again destroying the business by looking for non-existent synergies.” (Executive 
VP Business Division; Collective-Norway; Commercial; Customer Unit; 1:17) 
When the managers from both organisations referred to the structure and 
configuration of AMB, they talk about its ‘segmentation’ at several levels and the 
problems this causes. The label conveys also the ‘complicated’ or ‘messy’ structure of 
AMB. Segmentation also has implications for the ‘space’ in which collective action 
can take place as well as for limited or partial information sharing. The over-emphasis 
on each ‘segment’, and the need to manage and control them (i.e. function, business, 
production and customer interface units), focuses the attention on each separate 
‘segment’ and its efficient functioning rather than on the relationships between 
segments and how they work together within an overall organization. Connectivity is 
further hindered by the absence of integrated information systems (e.g. databases and 
email). Maintaining connections across the organization, and therefore relationships 
was therefore seen as very important for any future collective action: 
“If this is to work, there has to be an extremely good link between market segment and 
operations and after market… Someone, and this is a quite challenging role for the top 
management to lift themselves up and understand what's going on, because they are 
talking about huge organisation, and … someone has to understand what is going on as 
a whole for the future …” (Site Manager Factory; Collective – Norway; Commercial; 







Formal decision-making process and ownership  
 
The acquisition, and subsequent encounter with the ‘other’ –the Collective-, 
surfaced taken-for-granted assumptions regarding identity, culture, organizational 
structure and ‘power’ in both organisations. Although the Collective was acquired by 
AMB they were in fact living AMB’s proposed future as a  ‘systems integrator’.  
Thus, the Collective had in a short space of time gone through the AMB’s desired 
development trajectory before being bought up.  The Collective are the producers of a 
variety of products and attend to diverse markets, they are forced to be outward 
focused, tending to the needs of very different markets and customers, as well as 
providing ‘whole systems solutions’ for those markets and customers.  
This is why the third common theme expresses the tension between autonomy 
and control –headquarters vs. periphery-  among the two organisations.  It correspond 
with the description of the M&A as a ‘hostile take-over’: 
“…they had to split the cake and decide who is in what and when you have worked for 
the Company and many, which most of the people have for many years there is a 
loyalty to them.  So, there is an internal war that we are not releasing that information 
because they are taking over and what have you…”( VP Business Division; Collective 
–Norway; Commercial; Customer Unit; 6:5) 
The ‘empire building mentality’ felt by some as to be guiding the acquisition, 
illustrates also this tension. The use of this metaphor by the Collective reflects an 
increasing frustration with the lack of openness.  They also feel devalued as a leading 
commercial business and therefore under threat. On the other hand, AMB insists on 
the need to develop a common ‘standard’ based on AMB’s working practices, across 
the now ‘merged’ organizations. The new working standards are perceived as both 
positive – improved financial management- but also threatening. When the imposed 
standards impact on customer relationships or management of the world-wide service 
network of the Collective, then such standardisation is ‘centralising and problematic’: 
“but the basic behind the ways of working, the style of working is quite different but it 
has to be adopted to our type of business…but you have to actually select what is right 
for our type of business. You can't turn a marine business into an aircraft business, 
that's totally different.” (Site Manager Factory; Collective – Norway; Commercial; 
Operation Unit; 2:21 ) 
Centralisation implies a neutralisation of the Collective’s decision-making 
power and expertise value. Participation in the decision-making process of the new 
company appears to be beyond their reach, despite knowledge, skills and contacts in 
their particular market.  
“I think they feel as the owner, I think they have bought this company, they own it, I 
mean it's not ….. I don't feel that they treat the other, as equals.” (Executive VP 
Business Division; Collective-Norway; Commercial; Customer Unit; 1:40 ) 
This centralized model of decision-making is a central feature of AB’s way of 
organising, despite the official ‘matrix’ organization. Control is exerted from the top 
down and from the centre towards the periphery.  The Collective view their survival 
as dependent on the continued ability to be flexible through a distributed and 
decentralized decision-making model:   
“it is a much bigger organisation and for people who've just been working for many 
years, as I myself actually, in a small organisation you get used to speak with the 
owners every day and discuss problems coming up and you get a decision there and 
 10 
then…”( Site Manager Factory; Collective – Norway; Commercial; Operation Unit; 
2:12) 
 
The autonomy vs. centralisation tension constitutes a first hand experience for 
both the AMB and the Collective.  Here, we can actually visualise the ‘ongoing battle’ 
where history plays itself out, in an attempt to shape the organizational culture(s) of 
the future.  The current struggle over ownership of business and market is likely to 
play a significant role in the future development of business. 
 
Rethinking the Brand 
 
The new company’s identity and vision is also challenged by the merger. A 
way of understanding this challenge is through the technological development and the 
vision for the company’s future. AB is a technological innovator and leading in a 
particular type of technology, in this case the gas turbine.  As previously mentioned 
this technology shapes the way they work. The technology requires specialised 
behaviour which is context specific. Sometimes this localised way of working does 
not transfer easily.  This is starting to shape all the work processes of the new 
company allowing the Collective little autonomy in their field of expertise 
The organisations reputation and self-identity of excellence in the field, both 
in terms of quality and standards are also being challenged. For instance, one of the 
main characteristics of AB is the emphasis placed on ‘engineering excellence’ and the 
belief that the key to future successful development lies in continuing this tradition. 
The AB is a leader in its field, and interviewees frame their experience of the 
organization in these terms. However, the other side to this is, that the pride 
associated with excellence is followed by a certain degree of arrogance: 
“…across the whole of [the company] there is a strong pride in the product and the 
technical excellence of the company.” (Programme Director Business Division; AB-
UK; Naval; Customer Unit; 10:14 ) 
From the perspective of the Collective, interviewees acknowledge the 
‘engineering excellence’ of AB but also report that the imposition of the associated 
standards may inhibit new ways of organizing more appropriate for the commercial 
context.  In that context, the success of the business relies on the ‘relationship with the 
customer’ and not only on ‘engineering excellence’. That is why the possibility of 
inappropriately transferring a way of working from one context to another, is already 
perceived as negative in the emerging narrative of a new joint organization:  
“I hope that everything we do is connected to the market.  Everything we do should be 
driven from the market and we should organize ourselves from that perspective.” (VP 
Business Division; Collective -Sweden; Commercial; Operation Unit; 4:6) 
Brands embody both organisational identity – ‘engineering excellence’ and 
‘relationships with customers’ – and external relationships.  At the time of the merger 
AB initiated a process of  ‘brand co-existence’ with all the Collective brands, in order 
to ensure a degree of continuity with traditional Collective customers.  From the 
perspective of the Collective, AB brand represents quality and adds to their already 
strong and reputable brands.  However, the AB brand, as an unknown brand in the 
commercial marine industry, also brings with it price perceptions: 
“…the [AB] brand […] works two ways.  It has the quality image attached to it but 
definitively it also has a price image attached to it.  So I’m not so sure whether that, in 
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what way, that has worked for us, to be honest – it could be both ways.  But also the 
brand name is definitively a brand that is easy to join together as our own brand, I think 
it’s something that probably makes staff proud of being a part of the brand name.” 
(Executive VP Business Division; Collective-Norway; Commercial; Customer Unit; 
1:12) 
In our case both organisations – AB and Collective – are sites of embedded 
knowledge and expertise.  Their knowledge and expertise is appropriate for the 
context in which they operate and defines them both.  In a merger process, trying to 
‘assimilate’ can create an asymmetry resulting in the lost of the very knowledge and 
expertise the new organization would like to preserve as its strength.   
The acquisition made by AB was based on a narrative of progress, of 
development and growth.  However, the encounter with the ‘other’ –the Collective’- 
has lead employees in both organisations to question certain taken-for-granted 
elements of that narrative leading to tensions when it comes to think about future 
directions. We have found within this narrative of progress tensions, a reflection of 
the challenges to current ways of organising as well as the struggle for emergence of a 
new narrative. 
 
Co-creating a narrative space to act together 
 
The narrative that both companies share spans from the one product focus (gas 
turbine engine) in AB to the segment organisation focus (customer/market) in the 
current organisation and aims to move both companies towards focusing on being a 
‘systems integrator’ –providing full service and maintenance to consumers-  in the 
future. The way interviewees talk about the new common future organisation – 
‘systems integration’ and ‘whole value chain’ – provides us with the first insights of a 
commonly constructed narrative. The analysis shows employees on both companies 
projecting themselves into a common future.  The difference still arises in the role 
played by each, the how to achieve the future vision, between single provider or 
part(s) of the whole.  The terminology used reflects the centralised and de-centralised 
ways of working, respectively.  In the first instance, one actor does the integration, in 
this case the organisation: the organisation integrates systems – the systems are 
dependant on the organisation.  The second reflects a more networked way of working 
(chain) with organisations being integral parts of the chain but with value only 
deriving from the chain as a whole.  AB sees itself as a central agent (provider) of all-
incorporating systems for industry, whereas the Collective sees itself and part of a 
value chain (process) in achieving solutions for industry.  The difference in subtle but 
important and will effect future action. This new organisation would, according to 
interviewees, veer away from the current - cumbersome - organisational form, and 
would be able to incorporate both AB and the Collective: 
“they started as a shipyard but definitively over the years decided to grow into the 
whole value chain…when it comes to [X], we have always been a system integrator. 
We don’t understand why…I mean [the company] wants to transform the business into 
being a systems integrator, I definitively agree with that. But we have always been, we 
are probably the most successful system integrator in the world, where we have 
delivered huge packages… we have done this for years and years and it’s nothing new 
for us.” (Executive VP Business Division; Collective-Norway; Commercial; Customer 
Unit; 1:21) 
 12 
And to do so employees form both organisation are already suggesting 
alternative ways to work together. One of them is to modify current ways of 
organising such as information sharing. This will involve the exchange of relevant 
information in the organization. The lack of exchange at this point is explained as a 
technical problem related to security issues and to the lack of common IT 
infrastructure. In the future both companies agree that information should be 
accessible and more open for all employees to work with.  
“There is an internal war that we are not releasing that information because they are 
taking over and what have you.  So there is a tense – I think I have experienced from 
all, have impression from many of the places in different segments or units that they 
have had and still have problems with that…We may have suffered because they 
haven’t been able to get information for somebody.  I’m not saying purposely holding 
back but it doesn’t give us the priority which we would like to have and so on…” (VP 
Business Division; Collective -Sweden; Commercial; Operation Unit; 4:59) 
Agreeing on the need to leave certain aspects of the organizational cultures 
unchanged, interviewees talked about areas that can be transformed without altering 
the identity and essential business practices necessary for the continuity and survival 
in the respective industries: 
“I think that we are always going to be separate, mainly because of the customer part, 
the naval contractual requirements are always going to be different from the 
commercial.  The fact that the products are different doesn’t matter too much apart 
from the security requirements…” ( Programme Director Business Division; AB-UK;  
Naval; Customer Unit; 10:12) 
When the communication and emotional state required in order for the new 
organizational form to emerge are the focus, the positions cease to be opposites.  
Trust, between AB and the Collective, is recognized as necessary in order to be able 
to move into the future. But the two organisations are not there yet. There is too much 
resistance (to the hostile take-over), but yet not enough time (since the merger), and 
history:  
“Again, that’s the one thing, the management of face-to-face meetings and the building 
of trust across the business – it is an issue.” (Head of Business Management; AB 
Corporate-UK; Function; 8:86) 
 
Conclusions 
The paper has looked into the process of how people make sense - personally 
and collectively - of organisational change processes through the stories and 
narratives they share. We have seen how these stories have helped employees of both 
companies  to create continuity and commonality of reference and hence to legitimate 
particular ways of organising (Turnbull, 2002). 
But the frameworks that the employees use, are not static, they become (re) 
produced and challenged through everyday interactions especially when a change 
process occurs. Indeed, the constant changes in organisations and in the work 
environment challenge people’s efforts to create and maintain a sustained work-
narrative that allows for decision making processes or even to derive a sense of 
personal identity from work (Sennett, 2001). That is why stories are being constantly 
told and re-created.  
While the existing literature does an excellent job of illustrating the multiple 
stories that exist during organisational change processes, it does not generally 
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emphasise the interconnectivity of those narratives or the way in which those stories 
might impact on co-ordinated action. During change initiatives individuals are usually 
encouraged to coordinate their thoughts, actions and practices so as to be attentive to 
the interdependencies of the community (Vaara, 2002). A narrative approach provides 
a vehicle for understanding how organised collective action might be achieved within 
a changing situation (Tsoukas and Chia, 2002). Through the collection, handling and 
analysis of emergent narratives, as the ones explored in this paper, researchers could 
have a powerful vehicle for gaining insight about how such coordinated outcomes 
are(not) supported and achieved.  
The analysis has shown how through the co-authoring of a new narrative it is 
possible to articulate a new potential ‘organisation’. Through the co-construction of 
this new narrative, knowledge, people and environment can be co-created allowing 
the narrative to become a ‘proceduralised context’. 
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